Marianne Schark compares the Aristotelian and the Cartesian conception of organisms. According to the Aristotelian conception, living beings consist of a physical body (matter) and a soul (form), which is necessary for viability. According to Aristoteles, the organic body functions as the soul's tool. Supporters of the Cartesian conception criticize this theory by claiming that animals are nothing more than organized bodies and thus do not differ from machines. In general, those two conceptions vary regarding their interpretations of the nature of abilities: While, according to Aristoteles, living beings possess active abilities, Rene¿ Descartes rather considers them as merely having passive dispositions. Since it seems obvious that modern machines can be considered as organisms according to the Cartesian conception, in this paper, I will focus on the more ambiguous Aristotelian conception. I argue for the claim that modern machines can be considered as organisms even according to the Aristotelian conception of organisms. If this is true, we should seriously think about which distinctive features still differentiate organisms from modern machines and consequently, whether an introduction of new theoretical approaches of organisms is required.